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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
PERSONAL, CIVIL, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
SOUTH DAKOTA REQUIRES A JURY INSTRUCTION
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN JURY TAMPERING CASES
State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 610 N.W.2d 768
I. FACTS
On January 26, 1996, Debra Springer-Ertl's son Shawn allegedly
robbed, kidnapped, and murdered a taxicab driver.' Although the crime
occurred in Stanley County, South Dakota, the trial judge moved the trial
to Martin in Bennett County because of extensive pretrial publicity. 2
Prior to trial, Debra made 8.5" x 11" posters that proclaimed her son's
innocence. 3 Debra hung approximately thirty posters, mainly at busi-
ness places in the town of Martin, but she did not hang any at the
courthouse.4
The posters had a picture of her son, the date of his trial, and the
results of an excluded polygraph test that showed that her son had not
participated in the crime. 5 The posters were not addressed to anyone in
particular.6 No prospective jurors had been summoned for her son's
trial when Debra hung the posters, but 150 people had been drawn from
the county master list.7 Since Debra's son ultimately accepted a plea
agreement, no trial was ever held, and no jurors were ever summoned. 8
Debra was later charged with three counts of attempting to influence
jurors under South Dakota's jury tampering statute.9 The trial court
1. State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 2, 610 N.W.2d 768, 769. Shawn was a juvenile, age
sixteen, and was alleged to have committed the crimes with another juvenile. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. 3.
4. Id. 4, 610 N.W.2d at 769-70.
5. Id. 3, 610 N.W.2d at 769.
6. Id 6, 610 N.W.2d at 770.
7. Id.
8. Id. 5-6.
9. Id. 7; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-16 (Michie 1998). The statute reads:
Any person who attempts to influence a juror, or any person summoned or drawn as a
juror, or chosen an arbitrator or appointed a referee, in respect to his verdict or decision
in any cause or matter pending, or about to be brought before him:
(1) By means of any communication, oral or written, had with him, except
in the regular course of proceedings upon the trial of the cause;
(2) By means of any book, paper or instrument exhibited otherwise than in
the regular course of proceedings upon the trial of the cause; or
(3) By publishing any statement, argument or observation relating to the
cause; is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
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dismissed the information ' 0 at the arraignment, and the State appealed."l
The South Dakota Supreme Court remanded, holding that the trial judge
did not have the authority to dismiss an information for lack of probable
cause. 12
Ultimately, there was a trial, and the trial court denied the two jury
instructions that Debra requested.13 The jury convicted Debra of one
count of jury tampering.14 The trial court then granted Debra a new
trial, citing its own error in failing to include jury instructions on the
freedom of speech.1 5  The state appealed, and the South Dakota
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting a new trial and that at the new trial, Debra was entitled to a jury
instruction distinguishing between the right of free speech and the crime
of attempting to influence a juror.' 6
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are two fields of law applicable to this case; the first is the free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 17 The second applicable field of law is the fair administra-
tion of justice in the form of a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.18 Both of the aforementioned
constitutional guarantees have been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, with the result that all
States are prohibited from violating these rights of their own citizens.19
10. An information is an accusation of a crime against a person without an indictment. BLACK'S
LAW DICrnONARY 776 (7th ed. 1999). It differs from an indictment, which is an accusation of a crime
found by a grand jury. Id. at 783.
11. State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 7,610 N.W.2d 768, 770.
12. Id.
13. Id., 610 N.W.2d at 771 n.2. Debra's proposed instructions were:
[1] Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right.
[2] Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Id.
14. Id. 8, 610 N.W.2d at 770.
15. Id.
16. Id. 31, 610 N.W.2d at 777-78.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating, in part, that Congress shall not make any laws abridging
the freedom of speech).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in part, that criminal defendants shall fiave the right to an
impartial jury).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, in part, that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law"); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (stating that the freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected from impairment by the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (incorporating the
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A. DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENT RESTRAINTS ON THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The freedom of speech is "the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom." 20 However, freedom of speech
is not absolute. 21 As early as 1919, the Supreme Court began formulat-
ing tests to determine whether government restrictions on certain types
of expression, such as inciteful speech,22 were constitutional.2 3
The Supreme Court generally categorizes First Amendment scrutiny
into two tiers of analysis: content-based 24 and content-neutral 2 5 regul-
ations. Content-based regulations are those that focus on the content of
the particular speech. 26 These types of regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny, the most exacting type of judicial review. 27
An example of a content-based regulation was one in which the
government prohibited signs around a foreign embassy that tended to
bring that government into disrepute. 28 The Supreme Court, in Boos v.
Barry,29 struck down this statute. 30 The Court stated that the statute was
content-based because it prohibited an entire category of speech, that
speech which tended to bring a foreign government into disrepute.31
In order for a regulation to pass strict scrutiny, the government's
interest in regulating the speech must be compelling and the means used
to effectuate that interest must be narrowly tailored. 32 In Boos, the Court
applied strict scrutiny because the regulation was content-based. 3 3
Accordingly, the Court found that the means (outlawing a whole
category of speech) employed to achieve the stated compelling interest
(protecting the dignity of foreign governments) were not narrowly
Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
21. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (stating that the First Amendment is
not intended to immunize every use of language).
22. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (7th ed. 1999) (defining incitement generally as
persuading another to commit a crime).
23. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that Congress can outlaw
speech that is used in such circumstances and of such a nature that it presents a "clear and present
danger" of bringing out certain evils).
24. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (defining content-based as discrimination
of the subject matter).
25. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (developing the test for
content-neutral regulations); see also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
26. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
27. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-18
(1991).
28. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 318-19 (1988).
29. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
30. Boos, 485 U.S. at 316, 334.
31. Id. at 321.
32. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118.
33. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
2001] 377
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tailored because there were less restrictive alternatives available. 34 The
Court pointed out that a statute prohibiting threats to or harassment of
foreign public officials would be a less restrictive means. 35
Contrary to content-based laws, content-neutral regulations are not
aimed at the content of the speech but are instead aimed at the non-
communicative impact of speech. 36 When presented with a content-
neutral regulation, the courts apply an intermediate standard of review. 37
This intermediate scrutiny requires the following: the regulation be
within the government's power, the regulation be content-neutral, the
government have a substantial interest that it is trying to maintain, and
the restriction on the freedom of speech be no greater than necessary to
further the interest. 38
An example of a content-neutral statute was one that outlawed the
destruction of Selective Service registration cards even though one may
be expressing or communicating an ideal by committing an act such as
burning the cards. 39 In United States v. O'Brien,40 the United States
Supreme Court decided that this statute was within the government's
power because Congress has the power to make laws that are necessary
and proper to raise and support armies. 41 The O'Brien intermediate test
and the time, place, and manner intermediate scrutiny test are now
considered the same standard.42
The statute was found to be content-neutral because the statute only
prohibited the noncommunicative element, the destruction of the card, of
the defendant's conduct and not the expression itself. 43 The gov-
ernment's interest in assuring the availability of the certificates was
substantial. 44 The Court decided that the statute was no greater a restric-
34. Id. at 323-25.
35. Id. at 326-27.
36. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (concluding that the defendant's con-
viction would stand, in part, because the statute prohibiting the destruction of Selective Service cards
only made criminal the non-communicative aspect of destroying the card and not the expression of his
particular views).
37. See id. at 376-77 (stating that in order to justify incidental limitations on the freedom of
speech, the government interest needs to be sufficiently important to regulate the nonspeech aspect
when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in expression); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (stating that the O'Brien test and time, place, and manner test are
the same standard) (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)).
In O'Brien, the Court stated that it was not dealing with a case about speech mixed with conduct. See
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367-77.
38. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1981).
39. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 391.
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
42. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 298).
43. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
44. Id. at 378-79, 382. Some of the substantial interests asserted by the government to ensure the
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tion on the freedom of speech than was necessary because the Court
could not perceive of any alternative means that would better assure the
availability of the cards than one that prohibited the destruction of
them. 45
The Supreme Court also makes a distinction as to the specific
scrutiny that the government would have to satisfy based on the type of
forum in which the speech took place.46 If the forum in which speech
takes place is government or public property, the court typically
analyzes the restraint on speech under a public forum analysis. 47 The
same rules of scrutiny that the Court developed for content-based and
content-neutral regulations apply in public forum analysis. 48
Traditional public forums are those locations that have usually been
considered places for speech. 49 Examples of traditional public forums
would be streets and public parks.50 If the regulation of speech in a
public forum is content-based, then strict scrutiny applies. 51 If the regu-
lation is content-neutral, then the time, place, and manner intermediate
scrutiny test applies.52
Limited or designated public forums are those public places that the
government has opened up for expression. 53 The scrutiny for desig-
nated public forums is the same as that for public forums: if the regula-
tion is content-based, strict scrutiny applies; if it is content-neutral, the
time, place, and manner test applies.54
Non-public forums are those places that have not traditionally been
used for public speech and also have not been opened up by the govern-
ment for speech.55 Regulations for non-public forums only have to be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 56 Reasonable means that the regula-
availability of the certificates were: notification of the registrants, proving that registrants had regis-
tered for the draft, and facilitating communication between the registrants and the local draft boards.
Id.
45. Id. at 381.
46. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (stating that
the right of access to public property depends on the characterization of the property).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45.
49. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (stating that government control over
streets cannot unjustifiably abridge the right of assembly and speech which are immemorially
associated with streets (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938))).
50. Id.
51. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (stating that for content-based regulations the government needs a
compelling interest and narrowly drawn means).
52. See id. (stating that content-neutral regulations are constitutional if they are time, place, and
manner regulations).
53. See id. at 45-46 n.7 (stating that there is a second category created when a state has opened
an area for limited purposes to the public for expressive activities).
54. Id. at 45.
55. Id. at 46.
56. Id. (citing U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn's, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7
(1981)).
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tion is fair under the circumstances or appropriate for the end in view.57
A court looks to see if there are ample alternative modes of communica-
tion when it determines whether the regulation is reasonable. 58
In order for a regulation to be viewpoint neutral, it must not forbid
certain types of speech simply because the government does not agree
with the ideas espoused by the speaker.59 A government also may not
regulate the use of speech based on agreement or disagreement with the
underlying message. 6 0 In R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul,6l the Court
distinguished between content-based and viewpoint-based regulations. 62
The Court stated that a government may proscribe libel, but it cannot
proscribe only libel that criticizes the government. 63 Therefore, the
Court struck down a city ordinance that outlawed graffiti produced on
the basis of race, religion, color, creed, or gender because the ordinance
prohibited speech based solely on the subject of the speech. 64
B. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
AND THE RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
In situations where the government tries to outlaw certain types of
speech based on its interest in the fair administration of justice, the courts
apply a balancing test. 65 The courts balance the right to free speech and
the right of a court to take steps necessary to ensure a fair judicial
proceeding. 66 The United States Supreme Court, in Bridges v. Cali-
fornia,67 developed the "clear and present danger" test specifically for
dealing with speech versus impartial judicial proceedings. 68 The Court
held that "the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished." 69
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no definition for "clear
and present danger" with regard to the balance between free speech and
57. BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999).
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49, 53 (1983).
59. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (stating that government, in this
instance a city, cannot sanction speech simply because it is about a disfavored subject).
60. Id.
61. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
62. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.
63. Id. at 391-92.
64. Id. at 396.
65. Kemner v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 479 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (citing State
of Florida ex rel. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977)).
66. Id.
67. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
68. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 262-63 (discussing the "clear and present danger" test with respect to
freedom of the press concerning court proceedings).
69. Id. at 263.
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impartial judicial proceedings. 70 The Court has held that criticism of
judicial action already taken, even though the case was still pending, was
not a "clear and present danger" to the impartiality of a judicial
proceeding. 7 1 The Court also stated that the judge had a remedy in
damages for defamation. 72
The Court gave a further explanation of a "clear and present
danger" in Craig v. Harney.73 In that case, the press was held in con-
tempt of court for printing articles criticizing the judge in a certain
case.74 The articles criticized the judge for taking the case from the
jury.75 The articles also focused on the fact that one party to the litiga-
tion was a serviceman and was not personally available to defend himself
in the proceeding. 76
The Court decided that the threat of danger to the fair administra-
tion of justice must be imminent, not merely likely.77 The Court charac-
terized the language in the articles as strong and intemperate and
perhaps even unfair to the judge, but it stated that those things were not
enough to be contemptuous. 78 The language must present enough
danger to "immediately imperil" the fair administration of justice.79
The Court commented on the fact that judges are supposed to be able to
thrive in climates such as this and should not be prone to let public
opinion influence their opinions; as such, there was no threat or demand
upon the judge to change his decision. 80
The Alaska Supreme Court had an opportunity to deal with an issue
involving jury tampering and the First Amendment in Turney v. State.81
In that case, the defendant had contact with three jurors at one time and
two jurors at another time during the course of a case involving his
friend. 82 The defendant contacted the jurors and told them to call a
phone number that had information on juror rights.83 When a juror
called the number, he or she was told that jurors could judge the law as
well as the facts and that jurors could not be punished for their verdict.84
70. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 348-49.
73. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
74. Craig, 331 U.S. at 369.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 370.
77. Id. at 376.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 376-77.
81. 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997).
82. Turney, 936 P.2d at 536-37.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 536 n. 1. The information at the other end of the phone call was disseminated by the
2001]
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The defendant was charged with jury tampering and criminal trespass for
his contact with the jurors at the courthouse. 85
The Alaska Supreme Court construed the jury tampering statute to
require specific intent on the part of the defendant to influence a juror's
action as a juror, and therefore it did not reach the question of whether
the defendant's speech was protected by the First Amendment. 86' The
Alaska Supreme Court also stated that the statute would not reach those
wishing to inform the public about their rights as jurors because mere
advertisements by a person or group would not possess the requisite
intent to influence a juror in a particular matter.87 The court ultimately
concluded that the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion
to dismiss must be affirmed. 88
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Konenkamp authored the majority opinion which affirmed
the grant of a new trial to Debra.89 Chief Justice Miller concurred
specially to state that the issue was not whether Debra committed the
crime, but only whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial.90
Chief Justice Miller also stated that Debra would have been acting within
her constitutional rights if she were "standing on a soap box in the town
square" or broadcasting on television or radio, and, as such, she was
entitled to have a jury hear of her free speech rights.91 Justice Sabers,
joined by Justice Gilbertson, dissented and concluded that Debra was not
entitled to a jury instruction on the First Amendment merely because she
used words to carry out her illegal act.92
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The South Dakota Supreme Court stated that the authority of a trial
court to grant a new trial lay within that court's discretion; consequently,
the standard of review was abuse of discretion. 93 The court stated that it
Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA). Id.
85. Id. at 535.
86. Id. at 540-41.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 545.
89. State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 1, 610 N.W.2d 768, 768-69. Justice Konenkamp was on
reassignment and Justice Amundson concurred. Id. 33, 610 N.W.2d at 778.
90. Id. 36 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. 42, 610 N.W.2d at 779 (Saber, J., dissenting).
93. Delzer v. Penn, 534 N.W.2d 58, 60 (S.D. 1995) (citing Fullmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 498
N.W.2d 357, 361 (S.D. 1993)). An abuse of discretion is a failure to exercise sound legal discretion.
BLACK'S LEGAL DIcTIoNARY 10 (7th ed. 1999).
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required a clearer showing of abuse of discretion when a new trial was
granted rather than when it was denied.94
The court stated that it had never construed the jury tampering
statute.95 The court also stated that this was no ordinary jury tampering
case; most cases of this type involved defendants who directly or
indirectly approached and solicited individual jurors. 96 Accordingly,
there was no case on point.97
The court described the poster as public criticism of government,
and, therefore it approached the type of political speech that is fully
protected by the First Amendment. 98 Political speech has traditionally
been given the utmost protection in our nation's history. 99 The court
conceded that the speech in question could hardly be characterized as
merely a concerned citizen because the defendant had a personal interest
in the case.100 However, the First Amendment protects biased speech as
well as pure, objective political speech because if the First Amendment
only protected unbiased speech it would not be protecting much.l01
The court explained that this case presented a conflict between the
fundamental right to free expression and the fundamental right to
impartial justice. 102 The court stated that the First Amendment deserved
supremacy over other rights in most circumstances; however, the free-
dom of speech was not absolute. 103 The Supreme Court of the United
States said, in Cox v. Louisiana,104 that "[a] State may adopt safeguards
necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at
all stages is free from outside control and influence." 105
The court, although stating that the only thing that the state sought
to outlaw was public communication, did not say that strict scrutiny
applied, nor did it classify the statute as content-based.106 The court did,
94. Springer-Ertl, 9, 610 N.W.2d at 770; see also Fullmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 498 N.W.2d
357 (S.D. 1993) (stating that new trials may be granted for a number of reasons and that the grant of a
new trial will only be set aside after a clear showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court).
95. Springer-Ertl, 1 10, 610 N.W.2d at 771.
96. Id. One case involved a defendant who had another person give a jury nullification pamphlet
to a juror. See generally United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979).
97. See Springer-Ertl, 1 10, 610 N.W.2d at 771 (stating ordinary cases are where a defendant
solicits jurors through a third person).
98. Id. I11.
99. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (stating that speech was a fundamen-
tal liberty because our political history recognized that freedom of speech was an indispensable
condition of other forms of freedom).
100. Springer-Ertl, 9 11-12, 610 N.W.2d at 771-72.
101. Id. 12 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77, 792 (1978)).
102. Id. 9 16-17, 610 N.W.2d at 773.
103. Id.
104. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
105. Cox, 379 U.S. at 562.
106. State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 20, 610 N.W.2d 768, 774.
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however, cite the United States Supreme Court's statement that "when a
newspaper publishes information lawfully obtained, a state may impose
punishment, if at all, only when the statute is 'narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order."'1 07 The court made it clear that a state
has "an interest of the 'highest order' in maintaining the integrity and
fairness of its judicial proceedings."108
The court did not state that this statute was content-neutral, but it did
discuss public forums analysis, which is used by courts when deciding
whether the statute passes the O'Brien test. 109 The court discussed the
fact that Debra's posters were placed mainly in storefronts which were
visible from the sidewalk. 110 The court seemed to have been analogizing
the storefront placement of the posters to speech on a sidewalk, which is
typically considered a traditional public forum. 111
The court used the clear and present danger test to determine
whether this statute was constitutional.1 2 The court stated that regulation
of public speech on pending court proceedings is constitutional only
where there is a "clear and present danger" of actual prejudice to the
fairness of the proceeding or an imminent threat thereto.113
The court narrowly construed the jury tampering statute so as to
find it constitutional. 114 The court stated that a reasonable interpretation
107. Id. 25, 610 N.W.2d at 775-76 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)).
Although the court did not use the traditional "strict scrutiny" language, it appeared as though the court
was applying strict scrutiny to the statute. If the court had subjected the statute to strict scrutiny, it
would have asked whether there was a compelling state interest and if the means to effectuate that
interest were narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991).
108. Springer-Ertl, 26, 610 N.W.2d at 776. Since the court seemed to find that the first prong
of strict scrutiny was satisfied, the means used would still need to be narrowly tailored to achieve that
end. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118. In Springer-Ertl, the means used was a criminal
prosecution for a violation of a statute that outlawed communicating with jurors with the intent to
influence them. Springer-Ertl, 9 7-8, 610 N.W.2d at 770. At least one other court has found that
these means are too harsh and not narrowly tailored. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63
(1966) (requiring a judge to consider continuation of a trial, change of venue, sequestration, or a new
trial before putting a restraint on the freedom of speech). There are other less-restrictive alternatives
that the state could have employed to achieve its stated end. Id. The means of continuation of trial,
change of venue, sequestration of the jurors, or the granting of a new trial would have had no
restrictive effect on speech and would still ensure a fair trial. Id.
109. Springer-Ertl, 9 21, 610 N.W.2d at 774 (stating that public areas, like sidewalks, are
examples of traditional public forums (citing Schenck v. United States, 519 U.S. 47, 377 (1919))).
110. Id.
111. Id. 99 20-21; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 312 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
112. Springer-Ertl, 23, 610 N.W.2d at 775 (stating that regulation of public speech during cases
is justified by a clear and present danger of threat of serious evil (citing Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1069 (1991))).
113. Id.
114. See id 29, 610 N.W.2d at 777 (interpreting the statute as prohibiting conduct that is de-
signed to influence, specifically, jurors, including those drawn and summoned). By doing so, the court
could not have found the statute to be vague or overbroad because neither of those findings is typically
fatal to the statute. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONsTnUToNAL LAW 1326, 1337
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of the jury tampering statute would be to restrict it to conduct with the
specific intent to influence either summoned or drawn jurors. 1l5 The
court found that in order to be guilty of the jury tampering statute,
Debra must have had specific intent 116 to commit each element of the
offense.117  General intent 1 8 was not sufficient because a person who
merely wished to inform the public about a situation should not be
subject to the statute.119 The court also stated that its decision to narrow-
ly construe the statute was consistent with decisions of other courts in
dealing with the same issue.120 The court did not answer the question of
whether or not Debra had the requisite specific intent; it left that to be
resolved at her new trial.12 1
The court held that Debra was entitled to a jury instruction distin-
guishing between the crime of attempted jury tampering and the right to
the freedom of speech. 122 The court explained that the jury could have
logically concluded that since Debra attempted to influence the public,
and jurors were members of that public, that Debra attempted to influ-
ence jurors.123 The court stated that this reasoning would go against the
(13th ed. 1997) (stating that overbroad and vague statutes result in facial invalidation). This. sort of at-
tempt to only invalidate part of a statute or to construe a statute so that it does pass constitutional muster
is commonplace when dealing with the First Amendment. See id. at 1334 (stating that a narrowing
construction of an overbroad regulation can prevent facial invalidation).
115. Springer-Ertl, 31,610 N.W.2d at 777.
116. Specific intent is "[tihe intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later
charged with" or the specific act prohibited by law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (7th ed. 1999).
117. Springer-Ertl, 9 30-31, 610 N.W.2d at 777. The South Dakota Supreme Court requires
specific intent to influence a juror, meaning that the defendant must know that he or she is
communicating with a juror with the intent to influence that juror. I&a 30.
118. See State v. Poss, 298 N.W.2d 80, 83 (S.D. 1980). "General intent means the intent to do
that which the law prohibits .. " Id. There is no need for the individual to have intended the actual
result that occurred. Id.
119. Springer-ErtI 31,610 N.W.2d at 777. The court stated that it did not matter whether jurors
or prospective jurors would be present because the speech would not be designed to influence jurors,
only to inform the public. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 777-78. The United States Supreme Court considers the charge in its entirety when
determining whether jury instructions are sufficient. United States v. Jackson, 607 F.2d 1219, 1221-22
(8th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Cartano, 534 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1976)). A court is not re-
quired to give an instruction requested by counsel. Id. at 1221 (citing United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d
615, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1974)). Furthermore, if the instructions given by the court contain the requested
instruction in substance, the court need not give the proposed "extra" instruction. Id. A trial judge
may also refuse to give an instruction if it gives undue emphasis to the proponent's theory of the case
rather than being a simple statement of the appropriate law for the issue and facts of the case. United
States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449,
1453-54 (9th Cir. 1992)). South Dakota considers jury instructions sufficient if the instructions, when
considered as a whole, correctly state the law so as to inform the jury. Poss, 298 N.W.2d at 84 (citing
State v. Westphal, 273 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1978)). Additionally, "[a] trial court is not required to
instruct on matters that find no support in the evidence." State v. Kafka, 264 N.W.2d 702, 703 (S.D.
1978).
123. Springer-Ertl, 1 27, 610 N.W.2d at 776.
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narrow construction of the statute, so Debra was entitled to her jury
instruction to correct any misunderstanding. 124
The court also stated that there would be no violation of the statute
just because a prospective juror was a part of the public that the speech
was directed to. 125 Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's grant
of a new trial along with a jury instruction delineating between the
freedom of speech and the crime of jury tampering. 126
B. JUSTICE SABERS' DISSENT
Justice Sabers agreed with the majority that specific intent was
required in order for one to be guilty of this particular crime.127 Accord-
ingly, Justice Sabers saw no reason for a discussion of First Amendment
issues. 128 However, Justice Sabers did not elaborate on why a require-
ment of specific intent necessarily negated the need for a discussion on
the First Amendment. 129
Justice Sabers did not agree that Debra was entitled to her requested
jury instruction because "the First Amendment does not provide a de-
fense to a criminal charge simply because the actor uses words to carry
out her illegal purpose." 130 Justice Sabers went on in the opinion to
determine that the statute was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to
prevent criminal behavior. 131 Justice Sabers reasoned that the statute was
content-neutral because Debra's intent to influence jurors was at issue,
and the statute prohibits using any information to that end, regardless of
the content of the information. 132 The statute was narrowly tailored,
Justice Sabers said, because only speech that attempted to influence a
jury was prohibited.13 3
124. Id. 27-31, 610 N.W.2d at 776-77.
125. Id.
126. Id. 31, 610 N.W.2d at 777-78.
127. Id. 40, 610 N.W.2d at 778-79 (Sabers, J., dissenting).
128. Id. 77 41-42, 610 N.W.2d at 779.
129. Id. 7 40-42, 610 N.W.2d at 778-79.
130. Id. 42, 610 N.W.2d at 779 (quoting United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir.
1982)).
131. Id. 45, 610 N.W.2d at 780.
132. Id. 40, 610 N.W.2d at 778-79. A court would likely find that this statute was viewpoint-
neutral, not content-neutral because while it does address the impact of the content of the communica-
tion, it does not outlaw only communications to jurors by the defense or by the prosecution; they are
treated the same with respect to the statute. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)
(stating that the statute was content-based because it outlawed a whole category of speech, that which
tended to bring a foreign government into disrepute).
133. State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 41-42, 610 N.W.2d 768, 779. Justice Sabers, in classi-
fying the statute that way, was incorporating the First Amendment rationale although Justice Sabers
stated earlier that the First Amendment was not in issue. Id.
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Justice Sabers cited an Alaska case, Turney, in which the Alaska
Supreme Court found a man guilty of jury tampering for prompting
jurors to call a hotline to hear information about a jury's veto power.134
Justice Sabers stated that the present case was indistinguishable from the
Alaska case because the defendant in Turney, just like Debra in the
present case, intended to influence jurors. 135
C. SUMMARY OF CASE HOLDING
The court, in affirming the grant of a new trial to Debra, did not
find that she lacked the specific intent to influence jurors; it simply
agreed with the trial court that Debra was entitled to a jury instruction on
the First Amendment. 136 The jury may find specific intent present even
after hearing the new jury instruction, in which case, Debra will likely be
found guilty. It seems that the majority and the dissent agreed on the
prerequisite for the conviction-specific intent-but disagreed on pro-
cedure; the majority decided to send the case back for a trial, but the
dissent would have overruled the trial court and reinstated the jury
verdict. 137
IV. IMPACT
Since the South Dakota Supreme Court did not declare the jury
tampering statute unconstitutional, the State Legislature did not have to
rewrite it in order to make it constitutional. 138 The court narrowly con-
strued the statute to include the requirement of specific intent to in-
fluence a juror.139 The impact upon South Dakota prosecutors in the
future is obvious; they will have to prove specific intent in order to
convict someone of jury tampering.140 The impact on South Dakota
judges is that, after this case, they must instruct the jury on the distinction
between First Amendment protected speech and speech which is intend-
ed to influence a juror. 141 Although the prosecution does not plan to go
134. Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 536-38 (Alaska 1997).
135. Springer-Ertl, 48, 610 N.W.2d at 781 n.10 (agreeing with the Alaska court's rationale in
Turney). Justice Sabers found the cases indistinguishable even though Debra's information was in the
form of a poster, see id., and Turney's was in the form of oral communication with jurors, see Turney,
936 P.2d at 536-37.
136. Springer-Ertl, 31, 610 N.W.2d at 777-78.
137. Id. 31, 49, 610 N.w.2d at 777-78, 782.
138. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-16 (Michie 1998).
139. Springer-Ertl, 29, 610 N.W.2d at 777.
140. See id. 29-31 (construing the jury tampering statute to require specific intent to influence
a juror).
141. Id. 31, 610 N.W.2d at 777-78.
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through with a new trial in Debra's case, 142 the jury could have found
specific intent present even after hearing the new jury instruction. In
that case, Debra would have likely been found guilty.
At this time, only the Alaska Supreme Court has also construed its
jury tampering statute to require specific intent and knowledge on the
part of the defendant. 143 The South Dakota Supreme Court cited that
case and seemed to agree with the logic and holding, even though the
court distinguished it from the present case. 144
North Dakota currently has a statute prohibiting jury tampering.145
North Dakota's statute differs from South Dakota's in two substantial
ways; the first difference is that South Dakota's statute covers both oral
communication and written communication. 146 North Dakota's statute
does not include written communications, so it appears that Debra could
have hung her posters in North Dakota and not been subject to the plain
meaning of the statute.147 The second difference is that North Dakota's
statute includes the language "with intent to influence." 148 It seems that
there is no need for a court in North Dakota to construe the statute as
requiring specific intent because this is already present in the statute. 149
Thus, it seems that even if North Dakota had occasion to adopt the
reasoning of the South Dakota Supreme Court, one impact would be to
require trial judges to include another jury instruction. 150 This instruc-
tion would explain to the jury the types of speech protected by the First
Amendment and that speech specifically used to influence a juror is not
protected, according to the South Dakota Supreme Court. 151
142. Letter from Craig M. Eichstadt, South Dakota Deputy Attorney General, to author (Sept. 29,
2000) (on file with the author).
143. See Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 540-41 (Alaska 1997) (agreeing with the knowledge
requirement proposed by the prosecution and stating that specific intent was required).
144. Springer-Ertl, 610 N.W.2d at 778 n.4.
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-04 (1997). The statute states:
1. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if, with intent to influence the official
action of another as juror, he communicates with him orally or by means of a sound
broadcasting or transmitting device, other than as part of the proceedings in a case, or
harasses or alarms him. Conduct directed against the juror's spouse or other relative
residing in the same household with the juror shall be deemed conduct directed against
the juror.
2. In this section, "juror" means a grand juror or a petit juror and includes a person who
has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror, and any referee,
arbitrator, umpire, or assessor authorized by law to hear and determine the controversy.
Id.
146. S.D. CODtFiED LAWS § 22-11-16 (Michie 1998).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-04.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See State v. Springer-Ertl, 2000 SD 56, 31, 610 N.W.2d 768, 777-78 (stating that, on re-
mand with jury instruction, the question for the jury to answer was whether Debra knowingly targeted
jurors with specific intent to influence them).
151. Id.
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Another important limitation on North Dakota would be that the
courts would need to satisfy the clear and present danger test applied by
the South Dakota Supreme Court. 152 North Dakota courts also could not
construe their jury tampering statute so broadly that a person could be
held in violation of it simply because a prospective juror was a part of
the public the speech was directed to.153
V. CONCLUSION
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the hanging of posters
regarding a pending case in a town approaches speech fully protected by
the First Amendment. 154 The court stated that the case presented a
conflict between the fundamental right to free expression and the
fundamental right to impartial justice. 155 The court ultimately found
that there was not a clear and present danger of actual prejudice to the
fairness of the proceeding or an imminent threat thereto.m5 6 Additional-
ly, the court stated that specific intent is necessary for a person to be
guilty of jury tampering. 157 The South Dakota Supreme Court also held
that a person tried for jury tampering is entitled to a jury instruction
distinguishing between the crime of attempted jury tampering and the
right to freedom of speech.15s
Mandy Maxon*
152. See id. 9 23, 610 N.W.2d at 775 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1069
(1991)) (stating that regulation of public speech during pending court cases is justified by a clear and
present danger of threat of serious evil or an actual prejudice to the fairness of the proceeding).
153. Id. IN 27-30, 610 N.W.2d at 776-77.
154. Id. 11,610 N.W.2d at 771.
155. Id. 16, 610 N.W.2d at 773.
156. Id. 25, 610 N.W.2d at 775.
157. Id. 30, 610 N.W.2d at 777.
158. Id. 31, 610 N.W.2d at 777-78.
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